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With no agreement on definitions, the question of which indicators to use for study is an open one. This report presents Ottawa, Ontario as a growth-management success. Two indicators are used for evaluation: transit ridership and open space preservation. To achieve high rankings with these indicators, a city must have definite goals for the location of growth and the political power to see those goals through. Austin, Texas is an area with much interest in managing its growth. With its dissimilar political structure, it is presented as a comparison to Ottawa. Over the past thirty years, the two cities have carried out different actions to manage growth and this has affected aspects of their form and function. There are several reasons why Ottawa and Austin make a good match for comparison. One reason is that both cities are administrative centers. Ottawa is the capital of Canada. It is located on the Ottawa River, at the eastern tip of the province of Ontario (Figure 1). Directly across the river in the province of Quebec is the town of Hull. Austin is the capital of Texas. It is located in the south-central part of the state, about 200 miles inland from the Gulf of Mexico (Figure 2). It lies on the I-35 corridor with the city of San Antonio 83 miles to the south. Since 1970, both cities have experienced high growth rates. In the 1970-71 census period, Ottawa's population 602,510 and Austin's was half as large with 295,516. Austin then underwent explosive 7.7 percent average annual growth rates through the 1970's and began to rival Ottawa in size. Both cities grew quickly through the 1980's, Ottawa at 2.8% and Austin at 3.8% average annual rates.(1)
The urbanized areas in and around both cities now have roughly equal populations. By 1992, Ottawa's population was 974,077 and Austin's was 901,048. The populations of the greater metropolitan regions are nearly equal as well. In 1996, the Ottawa Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) population was 1,010,498; the Austin Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) population was 1,064,325.(2) The pattern of growth has been similar in both cities. In keeping with patterns seen throughout North America, growth has consistently been greatest on the urban fringe. In Ottawa the outer townships have been expanding the fastest (Figure 3). Kanata, on the western edge of the urbanized area, grew at 5.1% annually from 1991-95 while Cumberland on the eastern edge grew at 3.0%. Meanwhile, the city of Ottawa in the center of the region grew 0.6% annually.(3) The city of Austin grew 3.8% annually from 1990-98. That is fast growth, but still slower than surrounding areas (Figure 4). In the same time period, Burnet County to the west grew at 4.4% and Williamson County to the north grew at 6.6%. Some villages ballooned almost overnight into small cities. The suburb of Pflugerville immediately to the north of Austin grew at 19.2% and Cedar Park in Williamson County grew at 20.6% per year.(4) Overall, the Census Bureau ranks Austin as the seventh-fastest growing U.S. metro area in the 1990's. A second reason for comparison is the composition of job markets. Since both cities are administrative centers, the large number of government jobs have an anchoring effect. In Ottawa, 21.3 percent of jobs are in government and for Austin the figure is 23.5 percent.(5) Thus both cities have an employment sector that is less vulnerable to economic downturns and that tends to stabilize the local economy. Government jobs are generally located in the central city, which helps to keep downtown areas vital. They also maintain the demand for commuting routes that have downtown as a destination. Both cities are home to a flourishing advanced technology industry. Ottawa's 41,000 high-tech jobs (as of 1996) represented 9.5% of Canada's high-tech sector.(6) Austin's largest employers are Advanced Micro Devices, Dell, IBM and Motorola; total high-tech employment in 1995 was 68,800 (7). Both cities boast major universities which stabilize local economies and attract corporations. Because of their assets, these metro areas have comparably high household incomes. For the year 1995, Ottawa's median was US$35,758 and Austin's was US$39,522.(8) Household earnings have a significant bearing on travel modes because car ownership and usage tends to increase with income. The final reason for comparison is environmental. Both cities have fragile lands in their metropolitan regions. The Shirley's Bay and Stoney Swamp wetlands are on Ottawa's west side; on the eastern side of the city is the Mer Bleue peat bog and the erosive clay soils of Green's Creek. In Austin, hills on the western edge of the city lie over the highly porous, easily-contaminated Edwards aquifer. One section of those hills, the Balcones Canyonlands, are home to several rare species. Also, the Colorado River runs through the city; many lakes and springs in that riparian corridor are sensitive to degradation from runoff.
Ottawa The capital of Canada retained its rough frontier character through the middle of the 20th century. The center city was crisscrossed by half a dozen rail lines and accompanying warehouses and factories. Roads were inadequate and the city was rapidly expanding into the surrounding farmlands. The federal government decided to upgrade the physical layout and create a majestic city to befit an internationally important country. In 1958, the Canadian federal government formed the National Capital Commission (NCC) to implement the "Gréber Plan". This plan was designed to benefit the federal sector. Throughout the 1960's the NCC rebuilt Ottawa, focusing on efficient circulation in the core as well as dignification and beautification of the region. On the Ottawa side of the river, the NCC used appropriated funds and its power of eminent domain to form the 50,265-acre (20,350 ha.) Greenbelt. This crescent-shaped zone of open land was intended to contain urban growth, protect rural and natural lands, and provide recreational opportunities. The fragile environments mentioned above are all located in the Greenbelt. As the environmental movement matured through the 70's and 80's, concepts about the ecological function of land preservation changed. In its recent plan revision, the NCC has organized the Greenbelt's lands into "ecological units" based on soil texture. The most significant or fragile of these units are designated "core natural areas" and are supported by buffer zones and natural corridors for ecological linkage. The emphasis on connected biotic systems has resulted in a program of land swaps: In one instance, parcels on the Greenbelt's border were sold to finance the acquisition of 2,100 environmentally critical acres (850 ha.). On the Québec side of the river, the NCC acquired a wedge of land that extended from the urban core to the northwest. This land formed the core of the 88,000-acre (35,600 ha.) Gatineau Park. It was mostly forested, unlike the Greenbelt which had more agricultural and institutional land uses. The NCC did not use eminent domain in Québec so as to avoid straining federal-provincial relations. As a general rule, though, land protections are easier to impose in Canada than in the U.S. because the Canadian constitution has nothing like a 14th Amendment guaranteeing compensation for "taken" property. The Canadian constitution gives provinces the responsibility for land regulation. Ontario has no provincewide planning process, so at the request of Ottawa's localities the Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton (RMOC) was formed in 1969. It was led by a council of local elected officials and was given authority for land use, infrastructure, transit, and health and welfare services. This gave Ottawa a four-tier planning structure: Federal, provincial, regional and local. The lower three tiers were organized into a hierarchy that assigned powers according to the appropriate geographical scale of administration. The federal tier was not well integrated into the region's political hierarchy. In the 1960's the NCC acquired land by autocratic fiat and with little consultation or public review. The affected localities complained that they were left to "pick up the pieces" left by the NCC land grab. Later, as the NCC settled into an maintenance mode, it was the RMOC that took the political heat for land use decisions. Compared to U.S. examples, the RMOC is a powerful body that rivals state planning agencies in Florida and Oregon. However, compared to other Canadian metropolises it is only moderately strong.(9) When a landowner wishes to develop a property, he must first complete the local municipality's permitting procedure. Once the proposal is approved, it is forwarded to the RMOC which examines it for congruence with the regional plan and specifies conditions that must be met for approval. The RMOC's decision can be appealed to a quasi-judicial provincial board for the following reasons: The application is denied; the applicant disagrees with the conditions; or any member of the public disagrees with the subdivision design. There are no appeals possible after the province has rendered a decision. Soon after the RMOC was formed, it began setting broad goals for a transportation infrastructure and associated land uses. Although the NCC had built some scenic parkways, these were not adequate for daily travel needs. There was no other federal involvement; Canada has no national freeway system. The RMOC took over interjurisdictional transportation planning duties from the province. In 1974 the RMOC released its first official plan. It envisioned a dominant central core with high-capacity bus-only roads (the "Transitway") radiating out along five corridors. This strategy was called "transit first" because development of the bus infrastructure took precedence over other road construction. The downtown core was to remain the dominant job center, containing at least 20 percent of regional employment. Subsidiary nodes of jobs and services would be distributed in the suburbs and served by fast, frequent buses. Nine Primary Employment Centers were designated; these were defined as having 5,000 or more jobs and as being within walking distance (400 meters) of the Transitway (Figure 5). Secondary Employment Centers would have 2-5,000 jobs combined with a bus station. The plan also recognized the preference of area residents for low-density single family housing. Originally, the plan had no mention of preferred residential densities. Market-driven residential development was permitted to fill in the areas between transit corridors. Even so, from 1988 to 1993 over 2,300 high density residential units were built within walking distance of Transitway stations.(10) The RMOC's recently revised plan seeks to encourage attached and multi-family dwellings near the bus stations. The Transitway was used to guide growth in Ottawa's suburbs. Design of the 19-mile (31 km.) Transitway began in 1978; the first section was opened in 1983 and the full system was completed by 1996. RMOC planners successfully concentrated office and commercial developments near the designated urban centers. By 1990, seven years after service began, 73% of suburban commercial and office space was in the vicinity of Transitway stations.(11) Included in this figure were all of the region's major shopping centers. Most new housing was built in districts that were contiguous with suburban centers so as to avoid inefficient leapfrog growth. A key feature contributing to the success of the Transitway is its ability to be implemented in increments. For example, the Place d'Orléans station is located in the fast-growing township of Cumberland, outside the Greenbelt. The station currently serves as a focus for high-density development even though the exclusive bus right-of-way does not yet reach that far into the suburbs. Today, the buses travel on dedicated freeway shoulders, but concentrated job growth at the Place d'Orléans suburban center will justify the eventual construction of a Transitway extension. Another contributor to the Transitway's success is the flexibility of the vehicles. A bus will commonly operate on the high speed trunk line out of the city, and upon reaching a suburban neighborhood it will branch off and become a local bus. This express service eliminates transfers and accounts for the majority of bus patronage. Neighborhood street patterns must be designed for good circulation, so deeply-branched cul-de-sac forms are discouraged. Developers must provide space for stops that are convenient for pedestrian access. Riders can call an automated service that tells them when the next bus arrives, and headways on the Transitway are kept down to three minutes during rush hour. The RMOC plan has created a region that has the highest transit ridership of any mid-sized city in North America. In 1996, 17.1 percent of workers in the greater Ottawa area traveled to work by bus, compared to the Canadian average of 10.1 percent.(12) This high rate is helped by the Canadian attitude that public transit is a necessary and desirable utility, like water or electric service. Many middle-class Ottawans are comfortable using and even living near bus facilities because they are well operated, weather-protected and pleasantly appointed. Ridership rates are even higher when specific areas and routes are considered (Figure 6). Inside the Greenbelt, 31.4 percent of rush hour commuters ride the bus.(13) For workers traveling to downtown during rush hour the percentage doubles to seventy, and for workers heading to suburban Primary Employment Centers the percentage is thirty. At regional shopping centers, 25 to 30 percent of customers arrive by bus throughout the day.(14) The ROMC wants the transit system to carry 20 percent or better of all peak hour commuters in the region. In 1996, 32 percent of the region's jobs were within walking distance of Transitway stations; the RMOC wants to increase that figure to 40 percent.(15) It seeks these goals because high transit ridership has environmental, economic and quality-of-life benefits. The Transitway, a two lane road, can carry as many peak period commuters as a ten lane freeway. This decreases land consumption, air pollution, impervious surfaces and runoff. The convenience of Ottawa's transit system can allow households to do without extra cars and thus improve their economic status. Compared to Canadian regions with similar income levels, households near Transitway stations have a slightly lower rate of car ownership.(16) The RMOC has also bolstered pedestrian functionality by restricting parking between bus stops and the entrances of surrounding buildings. Only the outermost stations have park-and-ride lots, in order to intercept commuters as early as possible and reinforce transit ridership. The City of Ottawa and federal governments assisted the regional strategy by reducing parking supplies; additionally, the City allows builders a decrease of 25 parking spaces for each bus stall provided. From 1975 to 1986 downtown office space doubled, but the number of automobiles leaving downtown during rush hour declined.
Austin The state of Texas is libertarian and fiercely individualistic. To the south of Austin is the Alamo, which celebrates the heroic defense of pioneer territory from a oppressive Mexican regime. Texas traditionalism means "possession is nine-tenths of the law" and that land should be used to earn quick profits. Texans recognized how zoning could (among other things) protect property values, and in 1927 passed enabling legislation giving municipalities the power to zone. Even before World War II, Texas courts ruled that zoning ordinances had to follow a comprehensive plan. However, in most cities the ordinances constituted a de facto plan. It was not until 1989 that the state legislature explicitly required planning before zoning. Austin's planning activities reflect a political approach that is specific rather than comprehensive, overlapping rather than nested, and competitive rather than integrated. The metro area municipalities have fundamental planning power inside their borders. The region's counties are quite weak, but still bear certain operating responsibilities. Rather than one overarching regional authority like Ottawa's RMOC, Austin has a variety of regional groups charged with different and sometimes conflicting responsibilities. The Capital Area Metropolitan Planning Organization (CAMPO) was formed to comply with the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962. The organization's duties increased in 1973, and in 1991 its mandated focus changed from highway to multimodal planning. CAMPO provided regional transportation planning and inter-city coordination but had no implementation power. It was composed of elected and appointed officials and was funded by the U.S. government (80%) and the State of Texas (20%). The presence of numerous additional organizations in Austin makes comprehensive planning less efficient. The volunteer Council of Government, CAPCO, plans for environmental resources, community and economic development, emergency and social services, and provides paratransit for the elderly. The county highway department acquires right-of-ways to build major roads. The volunteer Austin-San Antonio Corridor Council plans intercity commuter rail facilities. These and other groups must strive to coordinate their efforts with the metropolitan transit agency, Capital Metro, under the aegis of federal transportation and environmental standards. The extra-jurisdictional areas that have the highest pressure to develop are therefore subject to much wrangling and controversy. Austin's growth policy follows the political winds like a fluttering flag. And to complicate matters, certain state agencies have implemented policies that radically altered the balance of power in the metro area. Austin's growth boom began in the late 1960's. Employers were attracted by inexpensive land, low taxes, non-unionized labor and research facilities at the University of Texas. The sunny climate, clean environment and a relaxed lifestyle attracted relocating residents. Austin was also known as a center of liberal, even countercultural thought. Control of Austin's development policy became a focus of political struggle, with liberal activism and quality-of-life on one hand and economic development and property rights on the other. From the mid-1970's to the mid-1980's the composition of Austin's city council oscillated between ideological poles. Said the Chairman of the city's Citizen's Planning Committee, "There was a sequence of pendulum swings. One city council was pro-growth, the next was anti-growth. The net result was no consensus."(17) From 1979 to 1981 city officials produced growth management measures with the twin goals of guiding the location of growth and protecting the region's watersheds. A "preferred growth corridor" was designated that paralleled I-35 on a north-south axis through the city. The land there was flat with stable soils, and it was contiguous with the urbanized area so infrastructure costs could be minimized. The city intended to annex land in the corridor and to deny the provision of infrastructure outside its borders. The city enacted environmental protections in the form of subdivision ordinances. These capped allowable densities on property that laid over the Edwards Aquifer, and on steep slopes. There were stormwater management requirements, and an innovative impervious surface standard. Had these measures been fully carried out, Austin would have been at the forefront of growth management among U.S. cities. The foundation of the city's strategy, annexation, crumbled when voters refused to approve new bonds for infrastructure. Supplying market demand, developers began constructing suburbs in the western hills, away from the preferred corridor. The result was inadequate water and sewers, administrative delays and finally moratoriums on permits. Austin developers then made an end run around the city's policies by obtaining water service agreements from the Lower Colorado River Authority. This is the state-sponsored regional agency in charge of water management and power generation; it maintains reservoirs and supplies water to municipalities. Austin developers were able to organize Municipal Utility Districts (MUDs) for their subdivisions, complete with bond-issuing authority to finance infrastructure and soft costs.(18) By 1984, there were twenty-three MUDs in the Austin suburbs, ranging from 300 to 3,000 acres in size. Austin can deny permitting consent to new water districts within 5 miles of its borders, but Texas law then allows a MUD to receive an override of the denial. However, the city has a bargaining chip. It has 120 days to negotiate concessions from the developer before giving him conditional consent. The city has pursued negotiated concessions with zeal. It attempts to accomplish through negotiation what is normally required by zoning: street and land use plans; infrastructure standards; public land dedications. Agreements were also made on the timing of future annexations of the MUDs. In this way the city gained some influence over the quality of the developments that would eventually be incorporated within its borders. But it had lost control over the location of growth, and the 120-day limit meant that concessions were made in haste and evaluated only briefly.(19) In such an unstable context, long-range comprehensive transportation planning was unfeasible. Regional transportation planning was limited to servicing Austin's sprawling development and mitigating the worst of its effects. CAMPO prepared five-year plans for transportation improvements that were carried out by other agencies. But since CAMPO had no implementing power, it ended up advising its member localities on how best to handle the land use decisions they had already made. Austin's growth was non-contiguous, freeway-oriented and low density. One result was a decline in the perceived quality of life. A survey taken of Austin citizens in 1985 found that highest priorities for quality of life factors were water quality and traffic. Furthermore, the factors with the greatest perceived declines were also water quality and traffic. The perceived trends in these instances matched objective measurements.(20) The 1990 Census found that 5.1% of rush hour commuters took mass transit to work, about the same as the U.S.
national average. Eighty-seven percent drove to work. The following table compares Austin's travel patterns with
Ottawa's:
b Source: Regional Municality of Ottawa-Carlton, "Draft Transportation Master Plan," <http://www.rmoc.on.ca/Transport/tmp-rep.html>, Apr. 25, 1999. The proportion of peak hour commuters using transit is more than 31/2 times higher in Ottawa's urban districts. On a region-wide basis, the 335 percent disparity is nearly as great. Bus service statistics are also illuminating. The Austin service area covers 505 sq. mi. (1308 sq. km.) and the Ottawa system covers 142 sq. mi. (370 sq. km.). The land areas served are not directly comparable because one-quarter of Ottawa's population lives in Québec and is not served by the RMOC (except in downtown Hull). However, the riders per square mile ratio can suggest the density distribution of the customer base. Austin's system carries 119,000 average weekday riders, so riders/sq. mi. is 236. Ottawa's bus service carries 265,000 average weekday riders (21), making riders/sq. mi. equal to 1,866. The difference in customer density results in part from Austin's discontinuous and unfocused growth pattern. Much of that growth took place in the hills to the west and northwest of the city. This desirable area had dramatic scenery and recreational opportunities such as hiking and boating. In one portion of the hill country the action of underground springs had carved caves, sinkholes and fissures in the soft limestone. This place was called the Balcones Canyonlands, and its unique environment was known to harbor rare species. In 1987 federal biologists determined that one of these species, the black-capped vireo bird, was endangered. Over the next three years, six more species were listed under the Endangered Species Act (ESA): the golden-cheeked warbler and five varieties of karst invertebrates (known as "cave bugs"). City officials proposed an extra-territorial protective ordinance and the state legislature refused the suggestion. Next, the city assembled an advisory committee composed of developers, scientists, environmentalists and government officials. With the advice of the Nature Conservancy, the committee proposed a preservation strategy based on a little-used provision in the ESA. Called a habitat conservation plan, it was enacted by Congress to work around the ESA's strict language. The plan allowed "incidental takings" (i.e., habitat destruction) by landowners if they agreed to set aside enough land to prevent extinctions. Specific areas would be marked for preservation and for development, so in theory both economic and ecological progress would be ensured. The biological advisory team initially recommended a conservation area buffer of 300,000 acres including 30,500 acres of dedicated preserves. Over the next seven years of negotiations the dedicated preserves were retained but the buffering acreage was eliminated. Instead, a developer could pay exactions for the right to build in the "conservation" zones of the Balcones. By doing this he could also avoid the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service individual permit application process. Environmentalists charged that the preserved area was too small for species survival, but funding difficulties and political opposition rendered their arguments moot. Today, the acquisition of habitat is funded by exactions from developers, county taxes, and a city bond. The direct comparison of open space preservation between Ottawa and Austin is problematic. There is as yet no objective, standardized criteria for determining "sensitive" land or "critical" habitat. Also, from one location to another there is an infinite range of differences in ecology and amount of land that is suitable for development. A quantitative measure of open space acreage is therefore a crude indicator at best. The Austin Planning Department calculates that 24,974 acres in its planning area are formally designated as open space. That acreage comprises 2.6 percent of its 1,518 sq. mi. planning area.(22) The Ottawa region contains Gatineau Park, the Greenbelt (29,146 acres/11,800 ha. of farmland and preserves) and open space in the urbanized part of Ontario (9,509 acres/3850 ha.). These total 126,655 acres-11 percent of the 1,799 sq. mi. CMA-that are formally designated as open space. Ottawa's relatively integrated political structure allowed the RMOC's environmental planners to assemble contiguous ecological preserves complete with buffer zones and natural corridor linkages (Figure 7). Austin stands in contrast with conservation areas that are fragmented and scattered across the region (Figure 8). The Balcones Canyonlands preserves will not have the buffering lands that were recommended, throwing the survival of its endangered species into doubt. Well-executed planning and a stable political environment do not account for all of Ottawa's growth management performance. Nivola (23) has identified a number of national policies that affect the patterns of urban growth. In the U.S., total transportation expenditures at all levels of government have been heavily skewed toward roads rather than transit. Canadian gas taxes are twice the U.S. rate, making gasoline one-third more expensive. Federal taxation and lending policies make owning a single family home in the U.S. exceedingly cheap. U.S. tax exemptions for employee parking and development bonds boost the pace at which suburban employment centers are constructed. Ottawa has been a growth management success and its nation's policies may have assisted its efforts. However, its future performance is by no means assured. Throughout the nineties, car-oriented office parks were built in the outer suburbs; today there are as many jobs in the outer ring as there are in the central core. There is increasing pressure in the urban fringes for "big box" retailing with abundant parking. These factors have resulted in declining transit ridership, from 85 million annual riders in 1984 to 71 million in 1996.(24) The outer municipalities have been grumbling about the RMOC's heavy-handed control; some suggest they would be better off seceding from the regional union. Developers complain about the complexity, high cost and time-consuming aspects of the permitting procedure. A conservative provincial government has pursued a policy of "disentanglement," which means that Ontario devolves responsibilities to the lower tiers and makes major cuts in funding. In its plans and public statements, RMOC is determined to meet these challenges. It proposes to reorganize itself into a single municipality, with the member cities and townships becoming wards. It has set ambitious goals for transit performance, aiming to have 20 percent of all peak-hour trips handled by transit in the year 2021. It is studying the construction of a light rail system to complement the existing Transitway. Austin's contentious political stage has recently seen signs of lessened tensions. Developers and environmentalists have cooperated on campaigns; one to preserve natural land and fund a downtown convention center; another to build a light rail system and a new freeway. Compromise is also driven by Austin's air quality, which is close to noncompliance for ozone. The city's new neotraditional zoning category can be requested by developers; it attempts to address congestion and quality of life concerns by allowing multi-use, walkable neighborhoods and corridors (Figure 9). Ottawa's success with mass transit ridership illustrates the effectiveness of a planning department with integrated
functions. The RMOC planned the system of Transitway and urban centers. It then was able to plan supporting high
density development in the centers and enforce the plan with its permit review powers. Ottawa's vast open spaces
show what can be accomplished by an autocracy, much like Haussmann's Paris. Austin has implemented significant
open space protections; they were achieved at the cost of continuous political warfare and concessions. Austin's
history makes for a more exciting story, but Ottawa's has brought about superior results. Notes 1. United Nations, Demographic Yearbook (New York: United Nations, 1972, 1984 and 1994). 2. City of Ottawa, "Discover Ottawa: Key Facts About Ottawa" <http://city.ottawa.on.ca/ottawa/city/web/d/d1/d1-keyfacts.html>, Mar. 28, 1999 and Capital Area Planning Council, "Population Change for Counties and Places in the Capital Area Planning Region 1990-1998", <http://www.capco.state.tx.us/Publication.htm>, Apr. 3, 1999. 3. Statistics Canada, "Statistical Profile of Canadian Communities," <http://ww2.statcan.ca/english/profil/> Apr. 3, 1999. 4. Capital Area Planning Council, "Population Change for Counties and Places in the Capital Area Planning Region 1990-1998", <http://www.capco.state.tx.us/Publication.htm>, Apr. 3, 1999. 5. Texas Workforce Commission "Austin-San Marcos MSA-Texas Labor Market Information" <http://www.twc.state.tx.us>, Apr. 5, 1999 and City of Ottawa, "Discover Ottawa: Key Facts About Ottawa" <http://city.ottawa.on.ca/ottawa/city/web/d/d1/d1-keyfacts.html>, Mar. 28, 1999. 6. Ottawa Economic Development Corp., "Ottawa's Share of Canadian Advanced Technology Employment,"<http://www.ottawaregion.com/ottawafacts/table5_3.htm>, and "Advanced Technology Employment," <http://www.ottawaregion.com/ottawafacts/table5_1.htm>, Apr.15, 1999. 7. Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, "Capital Regional Outlook" <http://www.window.state.tx.us/ecodata/regional/capital/capasmsa.html>, Apr. 4, 1999. 8. Statistics Canada "Selected Income Statistics for Individuals, Families and Households, 1991 and 1996 Censuses, Census Metropolitan Areas," <http://www.statcan.ca/english/Pgdb/People/Families/famil61e.htm>, Apr. 2, 1999 and U.S. Census Bureau, "Estimated Median Household Income by County, Texas," <http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/saipe/saipe93/estimate.html>, Apr. 15, 1999. Average 1995 currency conversion rate used is $1 Canadian = $0.73 US. 9. Ira M. Robinson and Gerald Hodge, "Growing Pains", Plan Canada, May 1998, p. 12. 10. Robert Cervero, The Transit Metropolis: A Global Inquiry (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998), p. 258. 11. Ibid., p. 253. 12. Statistics Canada, "Nation Tables," <http://www.statcan.ca/english/census96/nation.htm>, Apr. 1, 1999. 13. Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carlton, "Draft Transportation Master Plan," <http://www.rmoc.on.ca/Transport/tmp-rep.html>, Apr. 25, 1999. 14. Cervero, The Transit Metropolis, p. 251. 15. Ibid., p. 241. 16. Ibid., p. 258. 17. Ben Heimsath, Chairman of the Citizen's Planning Committee (a city-appointed advisory body). Quoted in Mike Greenberg, "Growth," Metropolis, Dec. 1996 p. 56. 18. Soft costs include such expenses as architectural and engineering services, legal support, financing charges and administrative costs. 19. Austin voters passed a measure in 1989 that placed strict controls on subdivisions in the aquifer recharge zones. The controls included density caps, impervious surface standards and mandated preservation of large trees. The aquifer recharge zones are shown in Figure 9. 20. Dowell Meyers, Priorities in Austin's Quality of Life: The Evidence From the Citizens (Austin: University of Texas at Austin, 1985) p. 25, 32, 39. 21. OC Transpo, "Facts and Figures: Ridership," <http://205.250.109.3/secondweb/administ/Administration/populatn.html>, Apr. 25, 1999. 22. City of Austin, "City of Austin Land Use Data: 1990 Land Use by Planning Area in Acres," <http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/landuse/ludata.htm>, Apr. 11, 1999. 23. Pietro S. Nivola, Laws of the Landscape: How Policies Shape Cities in Europe and America (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 1999), p. 12-34. 24. Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carlton, "Regional Profile: How We Travel," <http://www.rmoc.on.ca/plan/rp52.htm>,
Apr. 24, 1999. Bolger, Dan and John Morrall. "Planning Park-and-Ride Facilities in Canada." Plan Canada, July 1995, 9. |
